Guido Baggio & Marta Caravà: As a leading enactivist philosopher, on several occasions you have emphasized that pragmatism and neo-pragmatism can offer a fruitful contribution to situated approaches to cognitive science/the philosophy of mind. These contributions include – among others – the theoretical support that the pragmatist approach can give to both the enactive and the extended approach to cognition thanks to its integrative and dynamical view of cognition. This conversation will focu...

Emergence is a pivotal concept for interpreting the reality of natural and social human life in all its processual complexity. The recently renewed debate about this concept and the different forms of emergentism is particularly varied, widely referring to biology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind (Kim 1999, 2005, 2006a,b; Cunningham 2001; Pihlström 2002; El-Hani 2002; El-Hani & Pihlström 2002; Chalmers 2006; Bedau & Humphreys 2008; Corradini & O’Connor 2010; Okasha 2012; Humphreys 2016; Sarte...

The article argues in favour of a pragmatist enactive interpretation of the emergence of the symbolic and contentful mind from a basic form of social communicative interaction in which basic cognitive capacities are involved. Through a critical overview of Radical Enactivists (RECers)’ view about language, the article focuses on Mead’s pragmatist behavioural theory of meaning that refers to the gestural conversation as the origin of the evolution of linguistic conversation. The article develops as follows. After exposing the main elements of (...) REC’s theory of cognition and language that involve the construction of a theory of natural signs (teleosemiotics) and basic directionality (Ur-intentionality), some critical points of Hutto and Myin’s proposal will be highlighted. To foster a continuist perspective of language, the behavioural theory of meaning and language that Mead develops from the notion of gesture will be analysed. His theory is akin to REC and could augment the bare bones of REC’s sketched perspective, helping to include Ur-intentionality in a broader non-dualistic phylogenetic and ontogenetic theory of symbolic language from gestural communication, thus helping to overcome the distinction between a content-less intentionality and a content-involving intentionality, i.e., a semantic propositional intentionality. Furthermore, a recent revival of Mead’s theory testifies to its up-to-date relevance to explain the innate social dimension of human and non-human animals, and the human communicative capacity through the conditioning of bio-social canons and structures. (shrink)

The article highlights George Herbert Mead’s and Wilfrid Sellars’ reliance on a behaviourally-grounded conception of meaning as strictly related to the possibility of distinguishing mental from non-mental phenomena as both related to the semantic dimension. Mead’s position is in fact akin to Wilfrid Sellars’ argument that the concepts of ‘inner events’ are essentially inter-subjective. Thoughts are displayed as consisting of related linguistic acts linked inferentially through intra-linguistic moves that respond to a particular ‘language practice’ governed by norms. Introspection is an (...) ‘inner conversation’, namely an ‘inner’ speaking analogous to linguistic activity that does not involve actual equivalents of the words in the mind. (shrink)

The Timeliness of George Herbert Mead is a significant contribution to the recent “Mead renaissance.” It gathers some contributions first presented at the conference celebrating the 150th anniversary of the birth of George Herbert Mead held in April 2013 at the University of Chicago and organized by Hans Joas, Andrew Abbott, Daniel Huebner, and Christopher Takacs. The volume brings scholarship on G. H. Mead up to date highlighting Mead’s relevance for areas of research completely ignored by p...

L’Italia rappresenta un luogo del tutto peculiare per gli sviluppi del pragmatismo, fin dai suoi albori. A partire dalla fondazione del Leonardo nel 1903, Giovanni Papini, Giuseppe Prezzolini, Giovanni Vailati, Mario Calderoni (e molti altri) contribuirono a riprendere e a diffondere in Europa le principali istanze dei pragmatisti d’oltreoceano. Come è noto, questi filosofi non si limitarono ad essere vivaci interpreti del pensiero di Charles Sanders Peirce e William James, ma elaborarono anc...

Since the end of the twentieth century, cognitive science has been witnessing what is called a pragmatic turn, a change of perspective that considers pragmatists to be basically right about the nature of knowledge and experience (Engel et al., 2016; Madzia & Jung, 2016; Madzia, Santarelli, 2017; Schulkin, 2015). Generally speaking, the pragmatic turn paradigm suggests that cognition is fundamentally grounded in action; that is, fundamentally action-bound, “subserving the planning, selection, anticipation, and performance of actions” (Engel et al., 2013, p. (...) 206). The essays collected in this special issue on Pragmatism and Enactivism seek to determine the extent to which the encounter between pragmatism and enactivism can provide an opportunity to reflect upon the genesis and nature, limits, and potentialities of cognition, as well as the issue of how mind and world, nature and culture, experience and language coexist. (shrink)

: The article outlines some similarities between the perspectives adopted by Shaun Gallagher and William James. In particular, assuming that the issue of representation in cognitive systems provides a valuable starting point and testing ground for verifying James’ possible contribution to enactivism, we argue that there is a considerable degree of similarity between Gallagher’s and James’ non-representational models of direct perception. Furthermore, we propose that by combining James’s theory of time and spatial perception with Gallagher’s Husserlian-inspired theory of retentional-protentional structure, (...) we can strengthen the theoretical assumptions of enactivism, integrating elements taken from phenomenology and aspects of Jamesian pragmatics. Understood in this way, James’ enactive theory of action and perceptual causality provides a promising opportunity for an innovative and coherent enactivist research program. Keywords: Enactivism; Pragmatism; 4E Cognition; William James; Shaun Gallagher Rendere l’enattivismo ancora più pragmatico: l’eredità jamesiana nell’approccio enattivista alla cognizione di Shaun Gallagher Riassunto: In questo lavoro si pongono in evidenza alcune somiglianze tra la prospettiva enattivista di Shaun Gallagher e la psicologia di William James. In particolare, assumendo che il tema della rappresentazione nei sistemi cognitivi fornisca un valido punto di partenza e un terreno di prova per verificare il possibile contributo di James all’enattivismo, ritengo che esista una notevole assonanza tra l’anti-rappresentazionalismo di Gallagher e la teoria della percezione diretta di James. Sostengo inoltre che attraverso una combinazione della teoria del tempo e della percezione spaziale di James con la teoria di Gallagher della struttura ritentivo-protensiva di ispirazione husserliana sia possibile rafforzare i presupposti teorici dell’enattivismo, integrando elementi tratti dalla fenomenologia con aspetti pragmatisti. La teoria jamesiana dell’azione e della causalità percettiva sembra fornire una promettente opportunità per un innovativo programma di ricerca in ambito enattivista. Parole chiave: Enattivismo; Pragmatismo; 4E Cognition; William James; Shaun Gallagher. (shrink)

Il progetto comune dei pragmatisti (Calcaterra 2024) raccoglie una selezione di saggi del periodo di produzione di Rosa Calcaterra che va dal 2003 al 2016, rivisti o integrati in vista di questa nuova edizione. Il volume offre uno sguardo d’insieme del percorso teoretico di Calcaterra, focalizzandosi sugli autori pragmatisti che più hanno segnato il suo pensiero, segnatamente C.S. Peirce, W. James, J. Dewey, G.H. Mead, C.I. Lewis, H. Putnam e R. Rorty. Come hanno notato Michela Bella, Giovann...

The article aims to make a contribution to the contemporary debate on emergence by focusing on Conwy Lloyd Morgan’s and George Herbert Mead’s theories of emergence. Both authors, in fact, first elaborated a theory that tried to synthesize the biological, the psycho-physiological and the social dimensions of emergent processes. Since Morgan’s emergentism and Mead’s processual ontology were conditioned by the reflections that the two thinkers had developed over the years and traces back their roots to the early 1890s, the article (...) will be developed as follows. A brief description of Morgan’s conception of organic and mental evolution as elaborated in the 1890s and summarised in his Lowell Lectures will be outlined. Then Mead’s early writings on psychophysics and comparative psychology, pointing out a similarity between Mead and Morgan’s ideas on organic and mental evolution at that time will be introduced. Finally, their theories of emergence from the 1920s, pointing out more interesting similarities and dissimilarities will be examined. (shrink)

Hili Razinsky’s book aims to investigate the philosophical notion of ambivalence and to support an anti-irrationalist, non-contradictory, and anti-dichotomic perspective of this notion. The book is hardly ascribable to an explicit philosophical tradition: it includes references to both continental and analytic philosophers (from Heidegger, Husserl, and Sartre, to Davidson and Freud, among many others). Razinsky also offers examples taken from literary works to corroborate her replies to the f...

The aim of the article is to outline several valuable elements of Mead’s pragmatist theory of perception in action developed in his The Philosophy of the Act, in order to strengthen the pragmatist legacy of the enactivist approach. In particular, Mead’s theory of perception in action turns out to be a forerunner of sensorimotor enactivist theory. Unlike the latter, however, Mead explicitly refers to imagery as an essential capacity for agency. Nonetheless, the article argues that the ways in which Mead (...) refers to this capacity do not necessarily place it in opposition to enactivist non-representationalism. On the contrary, as a synthetic process of re-presenting of present and past sensorimotor elements, imagery can be seen as the hallmark of a pragmatically inspired sensorimotor enactivist approach that bypasses the opposition between representationalists and non-representationalists. (shrink)

The article argues in favour of replacing Dewey’s notion of 'experience' in today's cognitive sciences with Mead’s notion of 'act.' Although Dewey's approach to cognition is an essential contribution to the pragmatist turn of cognitive science and his theory of organic relation is particularly useful for future developments in this field, his notion of 'experience' risks proving to be the weak link in the program of empirical implementation of such a turn. In a perspective that shows a clear empirical intent (...) such as that of the 4E programme, the concept of experience, as intentionally vague and smoky, with its strong metaphysical significance, does not seem to offer a useful operational criterion to exclude from evaluation aspects that should not be considered constitutive of the mental. Moreover, in its openness to the overall determination of the relationship between organism and environment, this notion does not contribute to the definition of the phases that characterize the relational dynamics itself. The essay proposes as a solution to these difficulties to turn the attention to Mead's notion of 'act.' Although Mead's act and Dewey's experience are undoubtedly similar concepts, as the result of elaborations often carried out jointly by the two authors, the act seems more suitable to describe in its different characteristics the ideo-sensori-motor process that characterizes the integrated approach in which perception and action are indissolubly linked. Mead's theory of the act is an epistemological tool particularly useful to the empirical program of the 4E, also offering an interesting contribution to the debate between radical representationalists and enactivists. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe paper compares Mead’s and Quine’s behaviouristic theories of meaning and language, focusing in particular on Mead’s notion of sympathy and Quine’s notion of empathy. On the one hand, Quine seems to resort to an explanation similar to Mead’s notion of sympathy, referring to ‘empathy’ in order to justify the human ability to project ourselves into the witness’s position; on the other hand, Quine’s reference to the notion of empathy paves the way to a more insightful comparison between Mead’s behaviourism (...) and an explanation of the emergence of the linguistic from pre-linguistic communication based on empathic identification processes. However, Mead is less ambiguous than Quine in his use of the notion of sympathy finds a fecund parallel in the current neuroscientific and neuro-phenomenological hypothesis on ‘empathy’. The article contends that the ambiguity in Quine’s account of empathy is due to the exigency of trying to elucidate the link between the rules of language in a cultural context and... (shrink)

Interdisciplinarity plays a major role in the multifaceted thought of John Dewey. His theoretical interests cross the traditional academic boundaries in the name of improved research and teaching, and his works could be seen cumulatively as a systematic approach consisting of different interdisciplinary perspectives each intertwined with the next. On this issue, the essays gathered in Il pensiero di John Dewey tra psicologia, filosofia, pedagogia. Prospettive interdisciplinari, edited by Elis...

En partant de la théorie des émotions développée par Mead et Dewey dans les années 1890, les aspects centraux de la théorie gestuelle de Mead, qui sous-tend sa théorie de l’émergence de la signification, du langage et de la cognition humaine, seront mis en évidence. L’article souligne, en outre, comment la théorie de Mead s’inscrit dans une perspective sociobiologique sur la naturalisation du langage qui gagne en intérêt aujourd’hui, notamment dans le domaine des théories évolutionnistes du langage et parmi les (...) neuroscientifiques. (shrink)

The publication of G. H. Mead’s Mind Self & Society. The Definitive Edition has been long awaited by scholars and historians of the thought of the philosopher and pragmatist social psychologist. The editorial project of the University of Chicago Press followed this Definitive Edition with the publication of The Timeliness of George Herbert Mead (2016), a collection of the proceedings of the international conference held in April 2013 at the University of Chicago, also edited by Hans Joas and...

The paper seeks to show the potentialities of a wider perspective concerning human economic behavior and decision-making processes intertwining Mead’s and Sen’s ideas on self-identity and social context. Emerging developments of my findings strengthen, at once, the principled commitment to freedom of choice, revealing from a “Mead-Sen” perspective the instrumental role of social behavioral patterns and socio-cultural environment (social group, community, nationality, race, sex, and now social media) in the orientation of persons’ (economic) behaviors. In particular, a Mead-Sen approach would (...) help clarify how people develop their attitudes and dispositions to think and behave, namely examining the habits at the basis of everyday processes of evaluation and choice as manifestations of practical judgment. (shrink)

In the following pages I shall sketch some thoughts on Veblen’s implicit and explicit references to pragmatism and functional psychology, arguing that, besides Peirce and James, the functionalist theories and psychological experiments of the research group led by Dewey and Mead at the University of Chicago set the scene for Veblen’s intellectual revolution. More precisely, whilst Veblen did not mention it explicitly, it is possible to find in his writings of the years 1896-1900 references to Dewey’s notion of the “organic (...) circuit” and to Dewey’s and Mead’s theory of emotion.* This paper has three parts and three aims. In the first part, I outline Veblen’s criticism of economic science and his proposal for a new evolutionary economics, paying particular attention to Veblen’s implicit reference to Peirce’s logic. In the second part, I single out Veblen’s reference to Dewey’s and Mead’s works on functional psychology. In the third part, I will compare Mead’s hypothesis of the genesis of social interests in emotions with the evolutionary economic theory sketched by Veblen.* Tilman (1996: Ch 3) argued over pragmatic influences upon Veblen’s ideas concerning the human mind. James and Dewey’s functional psychology offered a psychological basis for his social theory. In my opinion, however, Veblen has been influenced by the Chicago School of functionalism more than by James’ functionalism, in particular by Dewey’s and Mead’s ideas. Moreover, even if Tilman (1998) points out Dewey’s intellectual debt to Veblen’s idea, his references consist normally in a period later than that considered here. (shrink)

In Cognitive Semiotics. Integrating Signs, Minds, Meaning and Cognition, Claudio Paolucci proposes cognitive semiotics as a fundamental component of a theory of human cognition that considers the “semiotic system” as co-constitutive of cognitive processes in action. His work takes its cue from the classical linguists and semioticians interpreted within the broader theoretical framework of cognition in action that links radical enactivism and classical pragmatism. He aims to bridge the gap bet...

In May 2013, Andreas K. Engel, Alexander Maye, Martin Kurthen, and Peter König published an article entitled “Where’s the Action? The Pragmatic Turn in Cognitive Science” in which they witnessed a “Pragmatic Turn” in cognitive science, i.e. the shift from a representation-centered perspective to a paradigm that focuses on the understanding of cognition as “enactive.” This new paradigm suggested that “cognition seems fundamentally grounded in action” (Engel et al. 2013: 206). The authors’ use...

While rooted in careful study of Mead’s original writings and transcribed lectures and the historical context in which that work was carried out, the papers in this volume have brought Mead’s work to bear on contemporary issues in metaphysics, epistemology, cognitive science, and social and political philosophy.

Ringrazio molto Guido Baggio e Maria Regina Brioschi per aver voluto organizzare e curare questo simposio sulla raccolta di saggi da poco pubblicata dalla casa editrice Carabba, che ha generosamente accolto il progetto del volume. A Michela Bella, Giovanni Maddalena e Marco Stango va la mia sincera gratitudine per l’attenzione puntuale e la cura con cui hanno letto i miei scritti, per i commenti e le questioni sicuramente importanti che hanno presentato e che continueranno ad alimentare le mi...

According to virtue epistemology, the main aim of education is the development of the cognitive character of students (Pritchard, 2014, 2016). Given the proliferation of technological tools such as ChatGPT and other LLMs for solving cognitive tasks, how should educational practices incorporate the use of such tools without undermining the cognitive character of students? Pritchard (2014, 2016) argues that it is possible to properly solve this ‘technology-education tension’ (TET) by combining the virtue epistemology framework with the theory of extended cognition (...) (EXT) (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). He argues that EXT enables us to consider tools as constitutive parts of the students’ cognitive system, thus preserving their cognitive character from technologically induced cognitive diminishment. The first aim of this paper is to show that this solution is not sufficient to solve the TET. Second, I aim to offer a complementary and more encompassing framework of tool-use to address the TET. Then, I apply it to the educational uses of ChatGPT as the most notable example of LLM, although my arguments can be extended to other generative AI systems. To do so, in Sect. 1.1, I present Pritchard’s framework of cognitive character and virtue epistemology applied in education, to which I am committed in this treatment. In Sects. 2 and 3, I respectively illustrate Pritchard’s (2014) solution to the TET, and I highlight the general limitations of his proposal. Thus, in Sect. 4.1 I characterize ChatGPT as a computational cognitive artifact using Fasoli’s (2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts. In Sect. 4.2, I introduce my proposal, which combines Pritchard’s account of virtue epistemology with Fasoli’s (2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts to address the TET. Finally, in Sect. 5.1, I present some epistemically virtuous uses of ChatGPT in educational contexts. To conclude, I argue in favor of a multidisciplinary approach for analyzing educational activities involving AI technologies such as ChatGPT. (shrink)

Skepticism is both a historical and foundational problem in epistemology. Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has provided a new expression of its threat. The Debasing Demon appears to generate a novel form of radical doubt, one that has gained prominence in recent debates. Instead of targeting the connection between belief and truth, it undercuts the link between belief and evidence (or reasons). This contribution presents the Debasing Demon Problem, analyzing its reach. It will provide an account for explaining how its threat is (...) raised, explore its relationship to classical varieties of skepticism, and assess some of the main objections against it. It will be argued that Schaffer’s Demon institutes a consistent epistemic threat, one that might represent the main variety of skepticism to be tackled in epistemology. Some consequences of this analysis are then presented concerning how to face this open problem. (shrink)

In public political deliberation, people will err and lie in accordance with definite patterns. Such discourse failure results from behavior that is both instrumentally and epistemically rational. The deliberative practices of a liberal democracy cannot be improved so as to overcome the tendency for rational citizens to believe and say things at odds with reliable propositions of social science. The theory has several corollaries. One is that much contemporary political philosophy can be seen as an unsuccessful attempt to vindicate, on (...) symbolic and moral grounds, the forms that discourse failure take on in public political deliberation. Another is that deliberative practices cannot be rescued even on non-epistemic grounds, such as social peace, impartiality, participation, and equality. To alleviate discourse failure, this book proposes to reduce the scope of majoritarian politics and enlarge markets. (shrink)

Donor conceived persons are likely to have a lower quality of life than persons who are genetically related to both parents. Empirical evidence is presented to corroborate this point. The evidence is subdivided into three sections: (1) negative experience of the donor conception itself, (2) negative effects of secrecy and openness and (3) negative effects of donor anonymity and donor identifiability. The principle of procreative beneficence requires parents to select the child with the best possible life. Given the difference in (...) quality of life, intended parents should try to have a genetically related child. This finding is also a strong reason for society to invest public resources in the development of techniques that enable people to create genetically related children. (shrink)

This paper provides a thorough analysis of two often informally stated claims. First, successful argumentation in the sense of persuasive argumentation requires agreement between the interlocutors about the rationality of arguments. Second, a general agreement about rationality of arguments cannot itself be established via argumentation, since such an attempt leads to an infinite meta‐regress. Hence, agreement about the rationality of arguments is a precondition for successful argumentation. As the paper argues, these plausible claims hold under the assumption that interlocutors are (...) subjectively rational and follow their own standards of rationality when engaging in argumentation. (shrink)

The proof paradox results from conflicting intuitions concerning different types of fallible evidence in a court of law. We accept fallible individual evidence but reject fallible statistical evidence even when the conditional probability that the defendant is guilty given the evidence is the same, a seeming inconsistency. This paper defends a solution to the proof paradox, building on a sensitivity account of checking and settling a question. The proposed sensitivity account of legal proof not only requires sensitivity simpliciter but sensitivity (...) of each relevant step of the proof procedure and/or sensitivity concerning all relevant alternatives. This account avoids problems that have been identified for other sensitivity views of legal proof. Moreover, it is argued that sensitivity, rather than safety, is the crucial modal condition for legal proof. It is, finally, shown that the provided account can fruitfully support very different existing views on the relationship between knowledge and legal proof. (shrink)

Questions surrounding deep disagreement have gained significant attention in recent years. One of the central debates is metaphysical, focusing on the features that make a disagreement deep. Proposals for what makes disagreements deep include theories about hinge propositions and first epistemic principles. In this paper, I criticize this metaphysical discussion by arguing that it is methodologically flawed. Deep disagreement is a technical or semi-technical term, but the metaphysical discussion mistakenly treats it as a common-sense concept to be analyzed and captured (...) by our pre-theoretical intuitions. Since the literature on deep disagreement is subject to this fundamental confusion and deep disagreement is not a helpful umbrella term either, I propose eliminating the notion of deep disagreement from the philosophical discourse. Instead of analyzing the nature of deep disagreement, we should develop theories about different forms of disagreement, including disagreement about hinge propositions and disagreement about epistemic principles, and, in particular, a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement. (shrink)

That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by principles of justification transmission but by two straightforward principles of rationality, understood as a concept of internal coherence. First, it is rational for S to believe the conclusion of an argument because of the argument, only if S believes sufficiently many premises of the argument. Second, if S (...) doubts that a source _O_ is reliable and believes that information _i_ is delivered by _O_, then S rationally suspends judgment about the truth of _i_. This paper aims to accomplish two tasks. First, it provides a thorough analysis of why bootstrapping argumentation is not an instance of rational persuasion. Second, it contains a more general theory about preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. (shrink)

In his logical treatises, John Mair develops a method and a set of rules for the verification of modal propositions, which is in the spirit of his predecessors Ockham and Buridan, but ultimately goes beyond them. He calls this method positio de inesse. It is also by this method that the truth conditions for divided modal propositions are set out. There is a standard interpretation of it as a form of reductionist method, and scholars have been tempted to think that (...) it was motivated by an implicit rejection of de re modal properties shared by Mair and other sixteenth- century nominalists. After presenting the background to Mair’s writings on the semantics of modal propositions, in this paper we revisit Mair's version of the method of positio de inesse. We argue that it is based on some basic semantic rules and contend that this procedure analyzes divided modal propositions into singular de re sentences referring to possible objects. Consequently, we conclude that this method does not reflect a reductionist approach to modal discourse. We instead provide an alternative interpretation. (shrink)

The book aims at a comprehensive account of the relationship between Wittgenstein s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Russell s philosophy as it developed between 1903 and 1918. The focus is on the central nucleus of the Tractatus, i.e., on its ontology and the picture theory of language. On Russell s side, the multiple-relation theory of judgment has been chosen as the leading theme around which the presentation of several other issues is organized. Whereas the similarity between Russell s and Wittgenstein s (...) problems is pointed out, the deep difference between their solutions is acknowledged, in particular with reference to the opposition between objects and names on the one hand, and facts and propositions on the other.". (shrink)

In this paper I generalize the new approach to nonmonotonicreasoning that was presented in [6]. This generalization results in the inconsistency-adaptive logic PRL . I give proof theory, semantics, mention interesting properties,and comment on the reconstruction and amelioration of other nonmonotoniclogics and mechanisms.